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Abstract
Variations of the Gale-Shapley algorithm have been used and studied exten-
sively in real world markets. Examples include matching medical residents with
residency programs, the kidney exchange program and matching college students
with on-campus housing. The performance of the Gale-Shapley marriage match-
ing algorithm (1962) has been studied extensively in the special case of men’s and
women’s preferences random. We drop the assumption that women’s preferences
are random and show that E
n
/n lnn → 1, where E
n
is the expected number of
proposals made when the men-propose Gale-Shapley algorithm is used to match
n men with n women. This establishes in spirit a conjecture of Donald Knuth
(1976, 1997) of thirty years standing. Under the same assumptions, we also es-
tablish bounds on the expected ranking by a woman of her assigned mate. Bounds
on men’s rankings of their assigned mates follow directly from the conjecture.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: C78, D63, D70
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1. Introduction.
One basic line of research in the field of two-sided matching problems is concerned
with the performance of the Gale-Shapley algorithm (1962). In particular, when the Gale-
Shapley algorithm is used to match n men with n women, how many proposals will be
made and what will an individual’s ranking of his or her assigned mate be? This pa-
per addresses these questions in the context of men’s preferences random and women’s
preferences arbitrary. That case is important as a transitional case halfway between the
well-studied case in which all preferences are random and the more general setting of men’s
and women’s preferences arbitrary.
Before we address these questions about proposals and rankings in the transitional
case, we need to describe the marriage matching problem and the Gale-Shapley algorithm.
Given n men, n women and for each individual a preference ranking of the n members of
the opposite sex, the problem is to find a stable matching into n couples, each consisting
of a man and a woman. A matching is stable if there do not exist a man and a woman
such that each prefers the other to his assigned mate. We will call the n ranking order
lists of each group (men or women) a preference profile.
As shown by Gale and Shapley (1962), the Gale-Shapley algorithm always produces
a stable matching. We will actually work with the McVitie-Wilson version (1971) of the
Gale-Shapley algorithm which produces a stable matching in n rounds. In round 1 the
first man proposes to his most preferred woman. She tentatively accepts and round 1 ends.
In round i > 1, the ith man proposes to his most preferred woman. If she has not been
proposed to before, she tentatively accepts and round i ends. Otherwise she tentatively
accepts man i if she prefers him to her current match, or rejects him otherwise. Then
the unmatched man, either man i or the man he displaced, proposes to his most preferred
woman among those who have not yet rejected him. Round i continues in this manner
until some woman receives her first proposal. The n tentative matches that exist after
round n make up the final matching. The McVitie-Wilson algorithm makes exactly the
same proposals as the Gale-Shapley algorithm, and yields the same stable matching. It is
easier to work with for our purposes since the proposals are made sequentially rather than
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in large batches.
In all that follows we will be discussing the number of proposals made and men’s and
women’s rankings of their mates when the men-propose Gale-Shapley algorithm is used to
match n men with n women. Wilson (1972) proved the following:
Proposition 1. (Wilson, 1972) For any profile of women’s preferences, if men’s prefer-
ences are generated randomly, then the expected number of proposals is bounded above
by n(1 + 12 + . . . +
1
n ).
The main result of this paper, Proposition 3 stated below, concerns a lower bound for
the expected number of proposals when men’s preferences are random and women’s pref-
erences arbitrary, but first we review some results proven under the stronger hypotheses of
random preferences for both men and women. Knuth (1997) describes the following result,
which establishes a lower bound for the expected number of proposals when preferences
are random, as the most important result in his book on marriage matching.
Proposition 2. (Knuth, 1997) If both men’s and women’s preferences are random, then
the expected number of proposals is bounded below by n(1 + 12 + . . . +
1
n ) −K ln4 n for
some constant K.
Under the hypotheses of Proposition 2, Pittel (1989) strengthened the conclusion of Propo-
sition 2, showing that as n increases the number of proposals divided by n lnn rapidly
approaches, in probability, 1.
But what can be said about the performance of the Gale-Shapley algorithm when
the assumption that preferences are random is dropped? In particular what can be said,
beyond the conclusion of Proposition 1, in the transitional case presented in the hypotheses
of Proposition 1–men’s preferences random, women’s arbitrary? This case is of interest
because it is a step towards the more realistic scenario in which men’s preferences as
well as women’s would be expected to exhibit some degree of positive correlation. It is
probably due to Knuth’s recognition of the importance of this transitional case that the
following conjecture is the only conjecture placed in the body of the text in his book.
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It also appears in the problem section. It combines a Proposition 2-like conclusion with
the weaker hypotheses of Proposition 1–men’s preferences random, women’s preferences
arbitrary and fixed.
Conjecture. (Knuth, 1997) For any profile of women’s preferences, if men’s preferences
are random, then the expected number of proposals is bounded below by
(n + 1)(1 + 12 + . . . +
1
n )− n.
Knuth’s conjecture can be motivated as follows. If women’s preferences are identical and
men’s random, Knuth (1997) proved that the expected number of proposals is (n+1)(1+
1
2 + . . . +
1
n ) − n. Any profile of women’s preferences other than preferences identical is
less highly correlated. Then one would expect the matching algorithm to produce more
exchanges of men accomplished by more proposals. That said, the conjecture is perhaps
overly optimistic in form. If true, it would constitute a best possible result, since it posits a
lower bound that holds for all n and is attainable when women’s preferences are identical.
In contrast, Knuth’s own result (Proposition 2 above), although proven under stronger
hypotheses than those of the conjecture, does not establish an attainable lower bound, or
even a specific bound since K is unspecified.
The following proposition establishes Knuth’s conjecture in spirit, in that it implies
that, for any  > 0, the product of 1−  and the conjectured lower bound is in fact a lower
bound, for sufficiently large n.
Proposition 3. If for each n > 0 Pn is a given preference profile for n women and En is
the expected number of proposals when n men with random preferences are matched with
n women with the given preference profile Pn, then
En/((n + 1)(1 + 12 + . . . +
1
n )− n)→ 1
and equivalently
En/n lnn → 1
Now let Rn be the expected sum of the men’s rankings of their mates under the
scenario governing Proposition 3. Since the number of proposals a man makes is equal to
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his ranking of his assigned mate, we have the following.
Corollary. Rn/n lnn → 1.
We also establish attainable bounds on the expected ranking by an arbitrary man of
his assigned mate.
Proposition 4. If n men with random preferences are matched with n women with arbi-
trary preferences, the expected ranking by a man of his assigned mate is bounded above
by n+12 and below by 1, and these bounds are attainable.
In addition to the theoretical results of Propositions 1, 3 and 4 above, there is another
study of marriage matching with non-random lists using computer simulations due to
Caldarelli and Copocci (2001), who introduce correlation into preference profiles, then
run the Gale-Shapley algorithm. They find that preferred men tend to be matched with
preferred women, and that there is less difference in satisfaction between proposers and
proposees than when lists are random.
For an overview of the matching mechanism literature, see Roth and Sotomayer (1990).
Most papers in the two-sided matching literature focus on problems in more complex real-
world markets, for example Roth, So¨nmez and U¨nver (2004) and Chen and So¨mnez (2002);
or on strategic considerations, that is, strategic reporting of preferences, for example, Roth
and Vande Vate (1991) and Demange, Gale and Sotomayor (1987).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains preliminaries. Propositions 3
and 4 are proven in Section 3. Section 4 establishes bounds on the expected rankings by
women of their assigned mates. Section 5 contains concluding remarks.
2. Preliminaries.
In the introduction, the description of the marriage matching problem, the definition
of stable matching, the description of the McVitie-Wilson version of the Gale-Shapley
algorithm and the statement of the results required little or no notation. For Sections 3
and 4 we require the following.
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In the marriage matching problem, men in the set M = {m1,m2, . . . mn} are to
be matched with women in W = {w1, w2, . . . , wn}. Each individual has an ordered list
of preferences over the n members of the opposite sex. A matching of M with W is a
function µ: M ∪W → M ∪W such that µ(M) ⊆ W , µ(W ) ⊆ M and for m ∈ M , w ∈ W ,
µ(m) = w if and only if µ(w) = m. For m ∈ M and w ∈ W , rw(m) is the rank of m by
w, which takes on values from 1, for w’s most preferred man, to n for her least preferred
man.
A random variable Xn is a function from the set MP of men’s preferences profiles to
the nonnegative reals, Xn: MP → +. The expected value of a random variable is
E(Xn) =
∑
t∈MP
Prob(t)Xn(t) =
( ∑
t∈MP
Xn(t)
)
/(n!)n,
reflecting the assumption in this paper that men’s preferences are random, that is, chosen
from MP with the uniform probability distribution. In Section 1, En, the expected number
of proposals and Rn, the expected sum of men’s rankings of their mates, are examples of
expected values of random variables. Also, E(Xn:Xn > a) is the expected value of Xn
given that Xn > a; and the probability of the event Xn = a will be written Prob(Xn = a).
If (an) is a real valued sequence then
lim sup an = lim
n→+∞LUB{an, an+1, . . .} and lim inf an = limn→+∞GLB{an, an+1, . . .}
where LUB is the least upper bound and GLB is the greatest lower bound. If lim sup an =
lim inf an, then limn→+∞an exists and is equal to lim sup an.
3. Proofs of Propositions 3 and 4.
Proof of Proposition 3.
Recall the hypotheses of Proposition 3: for each n > 0 Pn is a given preference
profile of n women and En is the expected number of proposals when n men with random
preferences are matched by the McVitie-Wilson version of the Gale-Shapley algorithm to
n women with the given preference profile Pn.
Proposition 1 implies lim supEn/((n+1)(1+ 12 + . . .+
1
n )−n) ≤ 1, so that it remains
to show lim inf En/((n+1)(1+ 12 + . . .+
1
n )−n) ≥ 1 or equivalently lim inf En/n lnn ≥ 1.
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For the remainder of the proof we consider a run of the McVitie-Wilson algorithm in which
the hypotheses of Proposition 3 hold, the men propose in random order and the women
are numbered in the order in which they receive their first proposals. It will help to think
of a woman receiving a number when she receives her first proposal.
We need the following simple lemma, whose statement and proof are closely related
to the statement of Proposition 1 and its proof by Wilson (1972).
Lemma 1. The expected number of proposals made to wj during the first L rounds
satisfies
E(#proposals to wj) ≤
{
0 if 1 ≤ L < j
1 + 1n−j +
1
n−j−1 + . . . +
1
n−L+1 if j ≤ L ≤ n
In the special cases L = j, 1 + 1n−j +
1
n−j−1 + . . . +
1
n−j+1 is to be read as 1.
Proof. The conclusion holds for L ≤ j, since the jth round ends when wj receives her
first proposal. Assume men have no memory, so that men choose their next proposal by
drawing numbered balls from an urn with replacement. This assumption can only increase
the number of proposals to wj in the first L rounds. Under this assumption, the expected
number of proposals to wj in round l, j + 1 ≤ l ≤ L, is at least
∑+∞
i=1 i
(
1
(n−l+2)
)i(n−l+1
n−l+2
)
= (n− l + 1)(∑+∞s=1 1(n−l+2)s )(∑+∞i=1 1(n−l+2)i )
which, summing geometric series, is
(n− l + 1)( 1n−l+1)( 1n−l+1) = 1n−l+1
Summing over rounds j + 1 to L completes the proof.
The following lemma says that the expected value of the multiplicative inverse of a
random variable that takes on two positive values is greater than or equal to the multi-
plicative inverse of the expected value of the random variable.
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Lemma 2. If x > 0, p, q, a, b ≥ 0 and p + q = 1, then p( 1x+a)+ q( 1x+b) ≥ 1x+pa+qb
Proof.
p
x+a +
q
x+b − 1x+pa+qb
simplifies to pq(a−b)
2
(x+a)(x+b)(x+pa+qb) ≥ 0.
Now we can begin to build a lower bound for the expected number of proposals.
Lemma 3. The expected number of proposals made to wj , 1 ≤ j ≤ n − 1, during all n
rounds satisfies
E(# proposals to wj) ≥
n∑
k=j+1
1
n− k + 2 + 1n−j + 1n−j−1 + . . . + 1n−k+2
Proof. Fix j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n− 1. For k > j, define short round k to begin when round k begins
and to end when either
1) round k ends (that is, when an unmatched woman is proposed to)
or
2) a woman who is matched with a man who has proposed to wj is proposed to (one
such woman is wj).
Suppose exactly r men have proposed to wj before round k. Then 1 ≤ r ≤ k − 1 and
E(# proposals to wj in round k) ≥
E(# proposals to wj in short round k) ≥ 1n−k+1+r (1)
Inequality (1) holds since the man who starts round k is as likely to–and any man displaced
without ending short round k is at least as likely to–propose to wj as to any of the other
n− k + r women who would end short round k.
For each r, let pr be the probability that exactly r men have proposed to wj before
round k begins. Then the following inequalities hold by (1), Lemma 2 applied repeatedly
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and Lemma 1 with L = k − 1, respectively.
E(# proposals to wj in round k) ≥
k−1∑
r=1
pr × 1
n− k + 1 + r
≥ 1/(n− k + 1 +∑k−1r=1 pr r)
≥ 1
n− k + 2 + 1n−j + 1n−j−1 + . . . + 1n−k+2
Summing over rounds j + 1 to n completes the proof.
We can now prove Proposition 3. Summing the inequalities in the conclusion of Lemma
3 over w1, w2, . . . , wn−1, the expected number of proposals En satisfies
En ≥
n−1∑
j=1
n∑
k=j+1
1
n− k + 2 + 1n−j + 1n−j−1 + . . . + 1n−k+2
On the graph of y = 1/x, a comparison of the sum 1n−j +
1
n−j−1 + . . . +
1
n−k+2 and
the integral
∫ n
1
dx
x yields
En ≥
n−1∑
j=1
n∑
k=j+1
1
n− k + 2 + lnn
On the graph of y = 1/x, a comparison of the sum
∑n
k=j+1
1
n−k+2+lnn and the integral∫ n−j+2+lnn
2+lnn
dx
x yields
En ≥
∑n−1
j=1 (ln(n− j + 2 + lnn)− ln(2 + lnn))
≥∑n−1j=1 ln(n− j + 2)− (n− 1) ln(2 + lnn)
=
∑n+1
j=3 ln j − (n− 1) ln(2 + lnn)
Furthermore, limn→+∞
(n−1) ln(2+lnn)
n lnn = 0 by L’Hopital’s rule, and a comparison on the
graph of y = lnx of the sum
∑n+1
j=3 ln j and the integral
∫ n+1
2
lnx dx yields
∑n+1
j=3 ln j
n lnn
≥
∫ n+1
2
lnx dx
n lnn
=
(x lnx− x)|n+12
n lnn
=
(n + 1) ln(n + 1)− n+1− 2 ln 2 + 2
n lnn
→ 1.
Therefore lim inf Enn lnn ≥ 1, which completes the proof of Proposition 3.
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Proof of Proposition 4.
Clearly E(rm(µ(m)) ≥ 1. Also, rm(µ(m)) = 1 if m is the first choice of every woman,
since m’s first proposal will be accepted. Thus, 1 is an attainable upper bound.
To show that E(rm(µ(m)) ≤ (n + 1)/2, consider first the McVitie-Wilson version of
the women-propose Gale-Shapley algorithm. Since men’s preferences are random, m’s first
proposal will be from a woman whose expected rank by m is (n+1)/2. In the men-propose
Gale-Shapley matching, m does no worse than his first proposal in the women-propose
Gale-Shapely algorithm. Therefore E(rm(µ(m)) ≤ (n + 1)/2.
Now suppose women’s preferences are identical and m is the last choice of every
woman. The sum of women’s expected rankings of their assigned mates is n(n + 1)/2 for
any matching algorithm, since for every matching regardless of men’s preferences, some
woman is matched with the first ranked man, some woman is matched with the second-
ranked man, etc. Since for every men’s preferences profile each woman does at least as well
in the women-propose matching as in the men-propose matching and for both matchings
the expected sum of women’s rankings of their assigned mates is n(n + 1)/2, each woman
does exactly as well. Therefore in every instance the women-propose matching and the
men-propose matching are identical. Also, in the women-propose Gale-Shapley matching,
m’s expected ranking of his assigned mate is (n + 1)/2, since his first proposal is the last
proposal made. Therefore also in the men-propose matching E(rm(µ(m)) = (n + 1)/2.
The upper bound of Proposition 4 is attainable.
4. Women’s Rankings of their Assigned Mates.
In this section, as above, the men-propose Gale-Shapley algorithm is used to match n
men with n women. Then we have
Proposition 5. For any women’s preference profile, if w ∈ W and men’s preferences are
random, then
E(rw(µ(w)) ≤ n + 12
Proof: Fix a women’s preference profile and w ∈ W and assume men’s preferences are
random. By relabeling the men we assume rw(mi) = i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. For k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n−
1}
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E(rw(µ(w)): rw(µ(w)) > k−1) = pkk+(1−pk)E(rw(µ(w)): rw(µ(w)) > k) (2)
where pk is the probability that mk proposes to w during a run of the Gale-Shapley
algorithm, given that m1,m2, . . . ,mk−1 do not.
During a run of the Gale-Shapley algorithm, mk must propose to some woman other
than µ(m1), µ(m2), . . . , µ(mk−1). Under the assumption rw(µ(w)) > k − 1, none of these
k− 1 women is w. Therefore under the assumption rw(µ(w)) > k− 1, the event that mk’s
first proposal to a woman other than µ(m1), µ(m2), . . . , µ(mk−1) is to w has probability
1
n−(k−1) . It follows that pk ≥ 1n−k+1 , so that if A > k, then
pkk + (1− pk)A ≤
( 1
n− k + 1
)
k +
( n− k
n− k + 1
)
A (3)
By (2) and (3) with A = E(rw(µ(w)): rw(µ(w)) > k), for k = {1, 2, . . . , n− 1},
E(rw(µ(w)): rw(µ(w)) > k−1) ≤
(
1
n−k+1
)
k+
(
n−k
n−k+1
)
E(rw(µ(w)): rw(µ(w)) > k) (4)
Applying (4) successively with k = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1,
E(rw(µ(w))) = E(rw(µ(w)): rw(µ(w)) > 0)
≤ 1n + n−1n E(rw(µ(w)): rw(µ(w)) > 1)
≤ 1n + n−1n
(
2
n−1 +
n−2
n−1E(rw(µ(w)): rw(µ(w)) > 2)
)
= 1n +
2
n +
n−2
n E(rw(µ(w)): rw(µ(w)) > 2)
≤ 1n + 2n + 3n + n−3n E(rw(µ(w)): rw(µ(w)) > 3)
.
.
.
≤ 1n + 2n + 3n + . . . + n−1n + 1nE(rw(µ(w)): rw(µ(w)) > n− 1)
= 1n +
2
n +
3
n + . . . +
n−1
n +
n
n
= 1n
(
n(n+1)
2
)
= n+12 .
The following corollary is immediate.
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Corollary to Proposition 5. Under the hypotheses of Proposition 5, the expected sum
of women’s rankings of their assigned mates is less than or equal to n(n+1)2 .
Notice that when women’s preferences are identical, the men-propose Gale-Shapley
algorithm (in fact any matching) matches one woman with the first ranked man, one
woman with the second ranked man, etc. Then the sum of women’s rankings of their
mates is 1+2+ . . .+n = n(n+1)2 . Therefore the upper bound of the corollary is attainable.
The assumption that women’s preferences are identical allows us to invoke symmetry and
conclude E(rw(µ(w)) = n+12 for every w ∈ W . In other words the upper bound of
Proposition 5 is not only attainable but attainable by all n women simultaneously.
Finally, we establish a lower bound for a woman’s expected ranking of her assigned
mate under the men-propose Gale-Shapley algorithm.
Proposition 6. For any women’s preference profile, if w ∈ W and men’s preferences are
random, then
E(rw(µ(w)) ≥
(n + 1
n
)(1
2
+
1
3
+ . . . +
1
n + 1
)
Proof. Fix women’s preferences, w ∈ W and assume men’s preferences are random. Relabel
the men so that rw(mi) = n− i+ 1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1 and run the McVitie-Wilson version
of the Gale-Shapley algorithm with mi beginning round i.
For 1 ≤ k ≤ n,
Prob(rw(µ(w)) ≥ n− k + 1) ≥ kn(n−k+1) (5)
since 1) rw(µ(w)) ≥ n−k+1 if w is proposed to in the first k rounds and w is not proposed
to in the last n − k rounds; 2) kn is the probability that w is proposed to in the first k
rounds; 3) the probability that w is not proposed to in the last n − k rounds is greater
than or equal to 1n−k+1 . (Notice that the word “if ” in 1) cannot in general be replaced
by “if and only if,” and that the words “greater than or equal to” in 3) cannot in general
be replaced by “equal to,” since during the last n− k rounds there may be times when a
man who has proposed to w in the first k rounds is proposing.)
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Then E(rw(µ(w))) =
∑n
k=1 k Prob(rw(µ(w)) = k) =
∑n
k=1 Prob(rw(µ(w)) ≥ k)
=
∑n
k=1 Prob(rw(µ(w)) ≥ n − k + 1) so that by (5), E(rw(µ(w))) ≥
∑n
k=1
k
n(n−k+1)
= 1n
∑n
k=1
n−k+1
k =
1
n (
∑n
k=1
n+1
k −
∑n
k=1
k
k ) =
(
n+1
n
)(
1
2 +
1
3 + . . . +
1
n+1
)
.
Consider the preference profile in which rw(mi) = n − i + 1 for all i and rw′(mi) =
i for all i, all w′ ∈ W − {w}. For this example, the argument justifying (5) yields
Prob(rw(µ(w)) ≥ n − k + 1) = kn(n−k+1) , since the “if ” in 1) can be replaced by “if
and only if” and “greater than or equal to” in 3) can be replaced by “equal to”. Therefore
E(rw(µ(w)) =
(
n+1
n
)(
1
2 +
1
3 + . . .+
1
n+1
)
. In other words, the lower bound of Proposition
6 is attained by w if the other women’s preferences are exactly the reverse of hers.
The situation here is not like the situation surrounding Propositions 4 and 5, in that
for the following corollary to Proposition 6, it does not seem likely that the lower bound
is attainable.
Corollary to Proposition 6. Under the hypotheses of Proposition 5, the expected sum
of women’s rankings of their mates is greater than or equal to (n+1)
(
1
2 +
1
3 + . . .+
1
n+1
)
.
5. Concluding Remarks.
For the men-propose Gale-Shapley algorithm with men’s preferences random and
women’s arbitrary, we have established attainable upper and lower bounds for the ex-
pected ranking by a man of his assigned mate; for the expected sum of men’s rankings of
their assigned mates; and for the expected ranking by a woman of her assigned mate. We
have also established an attainable upper bound for the expected sum of women’s rankings
of their mates. The question of an attainable lower bound remains open.
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